Psychological Determinism
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Are humans free to do otherwise?
See results without votingWhy you are not free to do otherwise
In this essay, I will discuss psychological determinism. Each premise and the conclusion will be explained. I will also discuss why the argument—as good as it is—is not totally convincing.
The psychological determinism argument begins with this premise: an agent’s decisions are determined by that same agent’s reasons. This is true because the actions of every single agent (person) have reasons that determine them even though those reasons might not always be known to the agent. For example, I might distrust someone because I have an unknown prejudice against him or her. This prejudice might arise from the fact that he or she may be too different from the group that I identify with. It is entirely plausible for me to distrust or dislike someone without being aware of the reasons why.
Our reasons are psychological in nature and they may include such things as belief, desire, anger, jealousy, pride, love, lust, etc. Given these facts, a rational person may ask what determines these reasons. Are they within or beyond our control? This leads to the second premise: an agent’s reasons and desires are ultimately determined by things beyond his or her control. This premise can be illustrated and justified with a simple example. Suppose you are trying to decide what kind of movie you want to see. You have two choices: an action-packed thriller or a “chick flick”. Your decision is determined by reasons beyond your control, such as your preference. You may choose the action film because that is just what you like or you may choose the “chick flick” for the same reason: preference. You do not choose what your preferences are, you just have them. These preferences are determined by factors outside of your control, e.g., genetics and the environment.
This leads to the third premise which states that if an agent’s decisions are determined by things beyond his or her control, then the agent is not free to make decisions. The argument then concludes that agents do not freely choose their actions; they do not have free will.
I believe that the argument is sound according to the incompatibilist definition of free will which states that an agent has free will as long as he or she is free to do otherwise. Given this notion of free will, the argument correctly concludes that there is no such thing as free will. However, the compatibilist view offers a different definition of free will. David Hume (a compatibilist) argued that we can still have free will even if determinism is true. He claims that an agent has free will as long as he or she is able to do what he or she wants to do.
A common criticism of incompatibilist determinism is its inability to account for morality and hold agents morally responsible for their actions. If people do not freely choose their actions, how can they merit blame or praise? The notions of reward, punishment, virtue, vice, etc. all seem meaningless in an incompatibilist world.
Compatibilist determinism has a way to account for morality and to hold agents responsible for their actions. If an agent is free as long as he or she is able to act according to his or her desires, then said agent does in fact have free will and may be held responsible for his or her actions. Hume even argues that an agent is most responsible when he or she acts directly from his or her desires. For example, intentionally pushing or shoving someone is worse than accidently running into him or her. In one instance, an agent may be held responsible while in the other, not as much responsibility may be assigned if any at all.
The issue, therefore, is one of semantics. How are we to define free will? The incompatibilists have to accept that morality cannot be accounted for if their view is correct. The comapatibilist view offers what seems to be a better view because it can account for morality given its definition of free will. The debate will continue as long as there is disagreement about how to define the concept of free will. I happen to agree with the compatibilist view due to the fact that it can more easily account for morality and explains how we are free to make choices in a deterministic universe. I conclude then that psychological determinism is not totally convincing and that it is possible for agents to freely choose in a deterministic world.
This is a really cool video with neuroscience
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Hey, Philanthropy!
Thank you for stopping by and thank you for the feedback!
"...I think you are missing quite a vital point."
Well, I happen to disagree and here is why:
1) "I believe the definition of free will is that of 'being able to make decisions free from external influence'."
That is essentially being free to do otherwise which is what I refuted in this hub. I understand that this hub is rather short but if you really think about the argument, it really does refute the idea of being able to do otherwise, or being able to choose independent of external forces. The argument basically makes the case that our reasons for acting are ultimately not up to us and do arise from factors outside of our own control.
2) "This definition accounts for intrinsic factors such as preferences and the like..."
No it doesn't. This definition is just another way of saying we are free to choose otherwise and like I said in my hub and in the earlier portion of this comment, our reasons for choosing arise from such factors (or causes) that are ultimately beyond our control, such as environmental factors. For example, we do not choose our preferences. You gave a scenario concerning changing our preferences that I will address later.
3)"Your hub is based on the assumption that the active mind and the subconscious are not considered as one thing or one person."
Really? Where? Not once did I assume that and I linked a video that provides evidence from neuroscience that the conscious mind is merely an effect of the subconscious processes of the brain. In other words, the conscious and the subconscious are two aspects of one thing: a physical brain.
4) "What is it considered when a person actively changes their preference or subconscious view of something?"
The better question is where did the person's desire to actively change his or her preference come from? Did he or she choose his desires? In your example, the man initially chose the chick flick because of a reason that was beyond his control, i.e., he wanted to for the sake of his girlfriend. Because that desire was stronger, or because his girlfriend was more important to him, he chose the chick flick instead of his weaker preference. Again, where did this reason come from? Did he choose to like his girlfriend or is it because he just did?
Take this other example: Suppose that you are trying to choose between different flavors of ice cream. You end up choosing chocolate because you prefer it over the other flavors (it is your favorite). Did you choose chocolate to be your favorite? If so, why? What was your reason? Because it pleases you more? Why is that? Do you really control that? The answer is no. But suppose you choose vanilla even though chocolate is your favorite. You might have chosen vanilla instead because you wanted to try something different for a change. But why did you want to try something different? Did that desire just emerge into your consciousness from your subconscious? The answer is yes. Therefore, your choice was due ultimately to reasons beyond your control.
So even though the man in your example can develop other preferences, his reasons for doing so are beyond his control. So my argument still stands.
Thank you for your thoughts. I am glad to see other people taking my hub seriously and really thinking about it.
Philanthropy2012 Level 5 Commenter 4 months ago
Hey a very interesting hub, it all makes sense, and you cover both views.
Though I think you are missing quite a vital point.
I believe the definition of free will is that of "being able to make decisions free from external influence". This definition accounts for intrinsic factors such as preferences and the like, stating that although it is not the active* choice of a person to have these preferences, no one else caused them, and so they are to be a responsibility of the body that holds them.
Your hub is based on the assumption that the active mind and the subconscious are not considered as one thing or one person. Whilst this is of course not the case. Therefore any decision made or predetermined decision (preference) by the subconscious prior to making an active decision is still all part of the same entity, just in two processes.
Another interesting idea to think about, is:
What is it considered when a person actively changes their preference or subconscious view of something?
For instance, in psychotherapy, irrational fears are often treated by associating them with positive emotions and positive feelings. Thus, any decision to do with this previous fear in the future will be lessened or different from that it was on a subconscious basis! Our preference for the most part is of course based on positive and negative emotional associations, so we can of course change our subconscious view of things.
For example, if a man did not like chick flicks but for the sake of his girlfriend, started associating them with positive emotion and other things he likes (many techniques for this), he might eventually end up liking them :o Though of course film contains a lot of variables, (story line, characters, etc.) that would take a while to reverse strong disdain for, so perhaps is not the most realistic example. :)
Just some thoughts,
Philanthropy,
(great hub btw, interesting C: )